Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes', 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se' and 'Theology and Verification'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / c. Religious Verification
Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG]
It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / d. Religious Falsification
Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG]